DFINITY Foundation

ICDevs.org

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Anvil

ICPL.app

ysyms

The Accumulators’ Neuron

RawTech Venture

Paul Young

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8YearGangDAO

Isaac Valadez

Krzysztof

Nicolas.ic

Smaug’s Neuron for Retail Investors

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🌮 TACO DAO Neuron

Ωmega-reject

Ωmega-vote

αlpha-vote

Cybersecurity

cyberowl

Dexter Caff/acc

JMVR

Smacker

CodeGov.org (see neuron merger plan with the Wenzel known neuron)

Wenzel

Synapse (see neuron merger plan with the Wenzel known neuron)

Update the network economics parameters that control various costs, rewards, and thresholds in the Network Nervous System, including proposal costs, neuron staking requirements, transaction fees, and voting power economics.

## Objective

Increase the NNS proposal rejection fee from 25 ICP (e8 2500000000) to **50 ICP** (e8 5000000000) as a direct response to a significant uptrend in proposal spam. The NNS can further increase the fee if this hike is adopted yet proves insufficient to address the issue. It can also reduce the fee at a later date (such as when ICP price is significantly higher than it is today).

## Background

The NNS proposal rejection fee was increased to 25 ICP in [proposal 134803](https://dashboard.internetcomputer.org/proposal/134803). Since then the ICP price has declined (reducing the effective fee), and recently the network has seen a raft of spam motion proposals, or otherwise bogus proposals that do not serve a legitimate NNS governance function (e.g. [140969](https://dashboard.internetcomputer.org/proposal/140969), [140971](https://dashboard.internetcomputer.org/proposal/1409710), [140973](https://dashboard.internetcomputer.org/proposal/140973)).

## Rationale

NNS proposals impose a real cost on the network: they consume voter attention, create operational overhead, and, in the case of low-quality proposals, degrade the governance process for everyone else.

The rejection fee exists to align incentives around proposal submission. A proposer must post the charge when submitting a proposal, but that amount is returned if the proposal is adopted. In other words, the fee is not a cost of making a good proposal that the community supports; it is a cost borne only when a proposal is rejected. This structure is intended to encourage proposers to think carefully before submitting, seek prior discussion where appropriate, gauge likely community support, and generally give proposals the consideration they are due before asking the rest of the network to review and vote on them. Individuals are also capable of crowdsourcing funds from multiple others who are willing to support a specific proposal. Inability to acquire support from peers may be an indication that a proposal is unnecessary, inappropriate, or otherwise not important enough to broadcast to the entire network (and to risk losing their funds).

In the current environment, the existing 25 ICP rejection fee no longer appears to be a sufficient deterrent against spam or low-value proposals. Increasing the fee to 50 ICP is a moderate adjustment intended to better restore that deterrent effect.

It is also relevant that the ICP price is materially lower today than it was when the rejection fee was last raised to 25 ICP. As a result, increasing the nominal fee to 50 ICP does not represent the same increase in fiat-equivalent terms that it would have when proposal 134803 was adopted. Put differently, this proposal primarily seeks to strengthen anti-spam incentives under present conditions.

## Proposed change

Set:
- reject_cost_e8s = 5_000_000_000

This will automatically take effect if this proposal is adopted.

Leave all other NetworkEconomics parameters unchanged (see proposal payload). Note that **0** and **null** are default values that mean the payload field is unchanged by the proposal (not that the value is being set to zero). This is explicit in [Network Economics documentation](https://learn.internetcomputer.org/hc/en-us/articles/34140518658068-Proposal-Topics-and-Types#:~:text=The%20default%20values).

## Trade-offs

A higher rejection fee modestly increases the downside for legitimate proposers whose proposals are not adopted. That is a real trade-off. However, the fee applies only to rejected proposals, and the increase is justified if it meaningfully reduces spam, encourages more prior deliberation, and helps preserve voter attention for proposals that merit serious consideration.

## Future review

This change should not be understood as irrevocable. If ICP price conditions change materially, or if experience shows that the higher rejection fee is either more restrictive or less effective than intended, the NNS can revisit the parameter in a future NetworkEconomics proposal. At that time, the community can decide—based on market conditions, observed proposal quality, and empirical evidence about the impact on spam—whether the fee should be lowered, maintained, or adjusted again.

## What is asked of the community

Vote to adopt this proposal if you agree that increasing the rejection fee from 25 ICP to 50 ICP is an appropriate and proportionate step to reduce spam and preserve the quality of NNS governance.

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This proposal has been submitted by [Lorimer's known neuron ♾️ 🐶](https://dashboard.internetcomputer.org/neuron/16459595263909468577)

Increase the NNS proposal rejection fee from 25 ICP to 50 ICP